

Deliverable D6.4
Report of the WP6 workshop on cross-sectoral
collaboration
Zagreb (CROATIA), 29-30 November 2023

Towards the building of a Guiding Document on cross-sectoral preparedness and
response to biological and/or chemical terror attack

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Contents

Consortium – List of partners	5
Abbreviations	6
Impact summary	7
Executive summary	8
MAIN RESULTS	9
1 Introduction	11
2 Objectives	11
3 Methods	12
3.1 Participants profile and nomination	12
3.2 Participation	12
3.3 Workshop topics	13
3.4 Workshop organisation and moderation	13
3.5 Working sessions	13
3.6 Reporting	15
4 Results	15
4.1 Session 1: identifying priority issues per topic	15
4.2 Session 2: analysing and deconstructing	19
4.3 Session 3: ideal situation and intervention needed	24
4.4 Session 4: guiding document content and audience	29
5 Key conclusions	33
6 Annexes	34
6.1 Agenda	34
6.2 Participants list	37
6.3 Satisfaction survey results	38



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Consortium – List of partners

Partner no.	Short Name	Name	Country
1	HDIR	HELSEDIREKTORATET	Norway
2	Sciensano	SCIENSANO	Belgium
3	NCIPD	NATIONAL CENTER OF INFECTIOUS AND PARASITIC DISEASES	Bulgaria
4	SUJCHBO	STATNI USTAV JADERNE, CHEMICKE A BIOLOGICKE OCHRANY VVI	Czech Republic
5	HZJZ	HRVATSKI ZAVOD ZA JAVNO ZDRAVSTVO	Croatia
6	MoH-FR	MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES SOCIALES ET DE LA SANTE	France
7	RKI	ROBERT KOCH-INSTITUT	Germany
8	EODY	ETHNIKOS ORGANISMOS DIMOSIAS YGEIAS	Greece
9	NNK	NEMZETINEPEGESZSEGUGYI KOZPONT	Hungary
10	INMI	ISTITUTO NAZIONALE PER LE MALATTIE INFETTIVE LAZZARO SPALLANZANI ISTITUTO DI RICOVERO E CURA A CARATTERE SCIENTIFICO	Italy
11	RIVM	RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR VOLKSGEZONDHEID EN MILIEU	The Netherlands
12	NIJZ	NACIONALNI INSTITUT ZA JAVNO ZDRAVJE	Slovenia
13	MoH-ES	MINISTERIO DE SANIDAD	Spain
14	FOHM	FOLKHALSOMYNDIGHETEN	Sweden
15	DH	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. UK HEALTH SECURITY AGENCY	United Kingdom
16	MoH-MT	MINISTRY OF HEALTH - GOVERNMENT OF MALTA	Malta
17	IPHS	INSTITUT ZA ZASTITU ZDRAVLJA SRBIJEDR MILAN JOVANOVIC BATUT	Serbia

Abbreviations

CBRN-e	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives
DG ECHO	Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG HERA	Directorate General for Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority
ECDC	European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
EU/EEA	European Union/European Economic Area
GD	Guiding document
JA TERROR	Joint Action to Strengthen Health Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Terror Attacks
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SIMEX	Simulation Exercise
US CDC	United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
WHO	World Health Organisation
WP	Work Package

Impact summary

- The workshop has contributed to identify the key elements to feed the guiding document for improving cross-sectoral collaboration to respond to bio/chem intentional events currently under development.
- The applied methodology provides the opportunity to maximise the collection of experts' inputs and analysis.
- The discussions held focus on strategic preparedness and response building blocks: *surveillance systems, shared threat detection and joint risk assessment; cross-sectoral emergency planning and governance, including strategic stockpiling; cross-sectoral information sharing and communication flow in preparedness and response; cross-sectoral capacity building, human resources, training and exercise; and post-incident joint evaluation, recovery and corrective measures*. Additionally, experts discussed the scope, target audience, structure and main outlines to be considered for the development of the above-mentioned guiding document addressed to improve cross-sectoral collaboration in preparedness and response to bio/chem terrorist attacks, integrating all WP6 activities results.
- The guiding document should:
 - Be suitable for different target audiences, both political and strategic. For political level, a very short impact version is proposed.
 - Include the building blocks that structured the workshop, as well as the annexes to provide additional tools and references, templates, recommendations, check lists, supporting materials, with the intention of the improvement of the cross-sectoral collaboration and coordination.
 - Inspire and help countries to adapt it to their own context.
- In terms of sustainability, the guiding document should be a living document, open to continuous update and to adaptations to remain suitable in the future.

Executive summary

Work Package 6 (WP6) has organised a two days' workshop on cross-sectoral collaboration in the response to a biological or chemical terror attack. The workshop took place in Zagreb (Croatia), on 29 and 30 November 2023, with the participation of 45 experts from 13 European JA partners' countries, from the three relevant sectors: Health, Security-Law Enforcement, and Civil Protection.

During the workshop, participants followed an itinerary through different working sessions on strategic preparedness and response components to identify and analyse key issues related to five selected topics with focus on cross-sectoral collaboration:

1. Surveillance systems, shared threat detection and joint risk assessment
2. Cross-sectoral emergency planning (including strategic stockpiling) & governance
3. Cross-sectoral information sharing and flow in preparedness and response
4. Cross-sectoral capacity building, human resources, training and exercise
5. Post-incident joint evaluation, recovery and corrective measures

First, the participants were allowed to share the key issues related to each of these topics based on their own national experience. These issues were further prioritized during an interactive plenary voting session. Priority issues were then analysed based on past events or exercises experience and deconstructed to identify both facilitating and blocking aspects for cross-sectoral collaboration improvement.

Each group of experts had then the opportunity to reflect on what would be the ideal (or at least a better) situation and the required interventions to reach it in their own country, before exchanging their ideas in plenary session. The final goal was to better define the scope, target audience, structure and main outlines to be considered for the development of a guiding document addressed to improve cross-sectoral collaboration in preparedness and response to bio/chem terrorist attacks, integrating all the WP6 activities results.

MAIN RESULTS

Session 1: identifying priority issues per topic

Participants identified key issues at each topic-table and then went to the prioritization process.

In summary, the key issues prioritized in session 1 were:

- Resources for information sharing (1st prioritized), from topic 3
- Lack of awareness of each other's priorities and interests (2nd), from topic 1
- Planning joint exercises at local, regional and national levels (3rd), from topic 4
- Information not shared to other sectors (3rd) from topic 5
- Joint plan across sectors (4th), from topic 2
- Lack of funding, staff replacement and retention of staff (4th), from topic 4
- Close the gaps and embed it to training (5th), from topic 4
- Clear chain of command for information sharing (5th), from topic 3

Session 2: analysing and deconstructing

As a result, from the session 2, the raised "key issues" were analysed in terms of "what went well or bad" in their own country experience and the related facilitating and blocking aspects.

In summary,

- **Facilitating aspects:** standard forms, tools for info sharing, clear definitions and procedures, regular reports, legislation and specific funds for exercises, dedicated staff, well planned and define roles and responsibilities, accountability after action evaluation and feed training and exercises with lessons learnt, retention of staff.
- **Blocking aspects:** lack of trust and person dependency, lack of willingness to share information during peace times, exchanges of information between sectors too limited to very high level, lack of interoperability, lack of cross-sectoral communication, fear of leaked information, competing priorities for funding and low availability of valuable skills.

Session 3: ideal situation and intervention needed

The session explored the ideal situation according to the perspective of all the country-participants, and the necessary steps to follow to reach this ideal situation drawn.

In summary, the main sights to reach an ideal situation for the cross-sectoral collaboration are the following: some mentioned the legislation to have a solid legal framework, with the roles and responsibilities embedded in the preparedness legislation. It was also mentioned to have regular funds, a national agency for crisis management at the highest level, regular communication mechanisms, a platform and tools to share information, interoperability and interconnected surveillance, joint risk assessment, regular and mandatory training and exercises, standardization of capabilities adapted to current risks evaluation, after event reviews to feed the plans, protocols and SOPs.

Session 4: guiding document content and audience

The session explored proposals on the content and audience of the Guiding Document.

In summary, the key issues prioritized in session 4 were (see table 5):

Regarding **target audience**:

- Document should be suitable for different levels, both political and strategic. For political level, a very short impact version is indicated.

Regarding **the content**:

- It should include concrete elements (e.g., good practices), not being too generic.
- Use of annex to provide additional tools and references, templates, recommendations, check lists, supporting materials, but no procedures (that should be developed according to countries features).
- Document should not be too strict, preferably it should provide methodologies/solutions that can be adapted to the countries.
- Document should stay open to adaptations to remain suitable in the future.

1 Introduction

European Commission co-funds the Joint Action TERROR (JA TERROR), whose main objectives are to address gaps in health preparedness and to strengthen cross-sectoral work between security, civil protection and health sectors in the response to biological and chemical terror attacks. JA TERROR involves 34 affiliated entities from 17 European partner countries of which 15 are European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Additionally, one candidate country, Serbia, and one ex-Member State, the United Kingdom (UK), are also part of the joint action. JA TERROR is coordinated by the Norwegian Directorate of Health.

JA TERROR work package 6 (WP6) “Cross-sectoral collaboration: Security, civil protection and health” is led by the Ministry of Health in Spain and co-led by the National Institute of Public Health, Sciensano, in Belgium. The overall objective of WP6 is *to contribute to the improvement of national structures, plans and operational procedures regarding cross-sectoral collaboration in preparedness and response to biological and chemical terror attacks with a potential cross-border impact.*

The final output of the Joint Action (JA) TERROR WP6 is to develop a guiding document (GD) for supporting countries to improve collaboration between the Health, Security and Civil Protection sectors in the preparedness and response to biological or chemical terror attack. Different activities including a survey on mapping existing structures (D6.1) and subsequent experts interviews, a tabletop simulation exercise held in Madrid in 2023 (D6.2) and a systematic desk research (D6.3) have been conducted to produce the findings for this GD.

In addition to these activities, a face-to-face experts’ workshop has been organised in Zagreb (Croatia) in November 2023 to hold live discussions on strategic preparedness and response capacities around a biological or chemical terror attack, keeping the focus on cross-sectoral collaboration between Health, Security and Civil Protection.

The current report (D6.4) describes the main objectives, methodology and key principles resulting from these experts’ discussions, which will constitute to a new part of the material to be used for the GD development.

2 Objectives

The general objective of this international workshop was to establish the main aspects and content to build on the development of a guiding document addressed to improve cross-sectoral collaboration in Preparedness and Response to biological and/or chemical terrorist attacks, in the context of the WP6 activities results.

In particular, the specific objectives of this workshop were to:

1. Identify and prioritize the main issues to address.
2. Analyse the facilitating and blocking aspects for cross-sectoral collaboration improvement.
3. Define the scope, target audience and main outlines of the WP6 guiding document on cross-sectoral collaboration.

3 Methods

The 2-day workshop was conceived as an itinerary where organizers and facilitators guided the participants through different working sessions allowing to identify, analyse, deconstruct and design the pathway to reach the ideal situation on the cross-sectoral collaboration in preparedness and response to bio/chem terror attacks in the context of the European countries. The methodology used for this workshop aimed to mix the different approaches, sectors, national perspectives and expertise of the participants to feed the discussions in all the proposed topics.

3.1 Participants profile and nomination

The workshop targeted national experts as targeted audience of the future guiding document, of the three relevant sectors -Law Enforcement / Security, Civil Protection and Health– considered, from the 17 partner countries of the Joint Action. A nomination letter was addressed to the competent authority for the JA in each participating country, stating the following considerations and pre-requisites for participants' nomination:

- Be employed in one of the following sectors - Public Health, Law Enforcement, or Civil Protection;
- Participants are decision makers, policymakers and subject matter experts representing government and health/security/civil protection emergency response partners from different organisations that act in preparedness and response to a terror attack with biological or chemical agents;
- Participants need to be familiar with plans, procedures and all the steps in preparedness and response (management, communication, decision making, training) at strategic level, as well as the evaluation, lessons learnt and their implementation into the national regulations and procedures;
- Good working knowledge of English language.

The participation of the JA TERROR WPs' leaders and co-leaders was also highly encouraged.

3.2 Participation

Thirty-four experts from 13 Joint Action partner countries took part in the workshop; eighteen from the health sector; eight from security and eight from civil protection.

3.3 Workshop topics

Five main big topics categories were identified by WP6 lead and co-lead team to be able to cover most of the aspects outlined throughout the survey results, simulation exercise held in June 2023 and the experts' interviews.

- Topic 1: Surveillance systems, shared threat detection and joint risk assessment
- Topic 2: Cross-sectoral emergency planning (including strategic stockpiling) & governance
- Topic 3: Cross-sectoral information sharing and flow in preparedness and response
- Topic 4: Cross-sectoral capacity building, human resources, training and exercise
- Topic 5: Post-incident joint evaluation, recovery and corrective measures

3.4 Workshop organisation and moderation

The three regional workshops proposed in the Grant Agreement were merged into one large workshop, gathering all participating countries, in order to allow direct discussions between all the countries and avoid artificial splitting in geographical regions. The Croatian Institute of Public Health (HZJZ), as competent authority for Croatia, hosted the workshop in Zagreb, on 29-30th of November 2023.

During the two days, different working sessions were organized with specific topic discussions in small groups alternated with plenary sessions where everyone could hear and comment the main output from each specific topic-table. At least one facilitator from the organizer team (Spain, Belgium and Croatia) was assigned at each table to moderate the discussions, guide for consensus when needed and take note of the key outlines. A 'Facilitators guide' was shared and briefing meeting was conducted among the organizer team to ensure harmonized facilitation. A master of ceremony and a 'time keeper' were also designated.

3.5 Working sessions

The workshop consisted in guiding the experts to discuss through 4 steps across all the 5 topics in different modalities: individually, per country and in plenary. Key inputs were raised through different questions focused on the cross – sectoral aspects in preparedness and response to biochem terror attacks, aiming at fostering the collaboration, to feed the guiding document under development. This topic structure may have biased some results because some of the inputs raised may have been reported in more than one topic with different perspectives as links and overlaps between activities in different topics is possible.

Each working session had the same structure: discussion around a common question, consensus on the main findings/proposals from the group, presentation to the rest of the audience and plenary discussion.

The following working sessions were held, each focusing on one *main question* to discuss:

- **Session 1: Identification and prioritization of issues per topic**

According to your country experience what are the "key issues" of this specific topic that need attention in regard of the collaboration among the sectors?

For this purpose, the experts were mixed in different groups and rotated through the 5 tables to give them the opportunity to feed all the topics. Each group of experts had the opportunity to have a 20 minutes discussion in each one of the tables/topics. After the full rotation, a plenary session was held where facilitators briefly presented the main conclusions of his/her table-topic and participants discussed and agreed on priority issues among the results from the discussion ("key issues").

For the prioritization, each sector in each country received 3 stickers per topic (total of 15 stickers) to mark the three issues per topic they consider most relevant among all the proposed issues (and summarized by facilitators on a paper board). Each sector was assigned with specific stickers colour code, to get information on the priorities per sector.

- **Session 2: Analysis and deconstruction of selected issues per topic**

According to your country experience:

- a) *What went well/ what went wrong regarding the "key issues" of this specific topic in regard of the collaboration among the sectors?*
- b) *Which were the blocking aspects and the facilitating aspects that contributed those issues went well/ went wrong?*

For this deconstructing working session, experts were distributed per country and were invited to evidence "what went well and what went wrong", as well as which were the facilitating and blocking aspects, in the two most voted "key issues", prioritized in the previous session, in their country experience. Countries were distributed in 5 groups of 2 or 3 countries each looking for cross-sectoral representative groups but no other pre-selective issue considered to create the groups.

These two groups of countries were allowed to deconstruct each topic previously prioritized, keeping the same facilitator at each table-topic, to ensure aggregated reporting. At the end of the two iterations of the table-topic discussions, facilitators presented the summary of the discussions at his/her table, leaving short space for questions and discussion per topic.

- **Session 3: Ideal situation and path towards it**

What would be the ideal situation regarding cross-sectoral collaboration in the case of a bio/chem terror attack in your country, and which intervention would be needed to reach the ideal situation?

For this session, participants had the opportunity to draw from the previous five topics discussions and analyse possible ideal (better) situation as well as needed steps to reach it, topic per topic. This exercise was done by each country, before forming small groups of countries at each table to exchange on the main ideas. Each table appointed a spokesperson to present and discuss these ideas during the following plenary session.

- **Session 4: Content and audience for Guiding Document**

What should be the scope, the target audience and the main content (outlines) of the Guiding document?

For this final session, the same small groups of countries were kept at the same tables, in order to exchange on what they consider as useful features for the upcoming guiding document. Final plenary session to discuss and summarize these ideas, before concluding the workshop.

3.6 Reporting

Each facilitator was responsible to take notes of the main insights discussed at his/her table, with the back-up of one note-taker when possible.

After the workshop, tables template was provided by the WP6 lead and co-lead team to present the information in a structured and standardized manner. These tables are presented in the following section.

4 Results

The raw results of the workshop discussions have been reported by the facilitators in the table format shared below, including the insights from the working sessions 1 to 4. The number of votes (number of stickers) per issue and per sector are written down and a general ranking for the main topics has been added.

4.1 Session 1: identifying priority issues per topic

Participants identified key issues at each topic-table and then went to the prioritization process. All the identified issues are shown in the table 1. Main results are here referred to in the mentioned table.

In summary, the key issues prioritized in session 1 were (see table 1):

- Resources for information sharing (1st prioritized), from topic 3
- Lack of awareness of each other's priorities and interests (2nd), from topic 1
- Planning joint exercises at local, regional and national levels (3rd), from topic 4
- Information not shared to other sectors (3rd) from topic 5
- Joint plan across sectors (4th), from topic 2
- Lack of funding, staff replacement and retention of staff (4th), from topic 4
- Close the gaps and embed it to training (5th), from topic 4
- Clear chain of command for information sharing (5th), from topic 3

Table 1: Results collected during the identification of key issues and the prioritization scores.

Topic 1: Surveillance systems, shared threat detection and joint risk assessment Identified issues (<i>list with bullet points</i>)	Health Nº votes	Security Nº votes	Civil Protection Nº votes	Total Nº votes	General ranking
• Lack of awareness of each other's priorities and interests	7	5	6	18	2 ^o
• Not clear which is responsible sector	7	4	2	13	5 ^o

• Difficulties in categorizing a threat as intentional	6	3	3	12	
• Lack of joint intelligence and surveillance system	4	2	4	10	
• Difficulties when conducting an integrated risk assessment	0	1	0	1	
• Suboptimal procedures to share information on risks	0	0	1	1	
• Joint risk assessment only done in high levels	3	1	2	6	
• Confidentiality issues	2	0	1	3	
• Informed to be prepared	0	0	0	0	
• Crisis management platform	1	0	1	2	
• Threshold to share threats is person dependent	2	3	0	5	
Topic 2: Cross-sectoral emergency planning (including strategic stockpiling) & governance Identified issues (<i>list with bullet points</i>)	Health Nº votes	Security Nº votes	Civil Protection Nº votes	Total Nº votes	General ranking
• Joint plan across sectors	6	4	4	14	4 ^e
• Cross-sectoral communication on the plans	8	0	3	11	
• Operationalization of the plan (up to the different sectors and the local level)	2	2	2	6	
• Management of stockpiles across sectors (central stocks)	1	3	2	6	
• Matching political and operational agenda	0	5	0	5	
• Legislative framework	2	0	1	3	
• Central data collection system, including resources catalogue	2	0	1	3	
• Cross-sectoral detection capabilities	2	1	0	3	
• International and joint procurement of material	0	3	0	3	
• Equipment selection and interoperability	0	1	2	3	
• Shared use of equipment	1	2	0	3	
• Specific CB Terror plan, including judicial aspects	2	0	0	2	
• Updates of the plans (including technological advancement)	1	1	0	2	

• Total defense	1	0	1	2	
• Chain of command and headquarters (from the national level)	0	0	2	2	
• Data confidentiality	1	0	0	1	
• Link between strategic and operational level	1	0	0	1	
• Know and endorse each other's plans and responsibilities	1	0	0	1	
• Scenarios to plan for	1	0	0	1	
• Accountability	1	0	0	1	
• Use of private sector's capacities	0	0	1	1	
• Funding of stockpiles (cf specific and rare events)	0	0	0	0	
• Chemical substances disposal	0	0	0	0	
• Level of details and simplicity	0	0	0	0	
Topic 3: Cross-sectoral information sharing and flow in preparedness and response <i>Identified issues (list with bullet points)</i>	Health N° votes	Security N° votes	Civil Protection N° votes	Total N° votes	General ranking
• Resources for information sharing	9	6	4	19	1 ^o
• Clear chain of command for information flow	4	4	5	13	5 ^o
• Knowledge of needs and capabilities	5	2	4	11	
• Integration of more stakeholders	5	1	1	7	
• Information management tool adapted to cross-sectoriality	3	1	2	6	
• Access to classified information	2	3	0	5	
• Centralization of crisis communication	2	1	2	0	
• Formalization of the obligation to exchange information	1	1	1	3	
• Joint vs separate planning	1	1	0	2	
• Training of communication procedures	1	0	1	2	
• Transparency	0	1	0	1	

• Trust	0	0	0	0	
Topic 4: Cross-sectoral capacity building, human resources, training and exercise Identified issues (<i>list with bullet points</i>)	Health Nº votes	Security Nº votes	Civil Protection Nº votes	Total Nº votes	General ranking
• Planning joint exercises at local, regional and national levels	7	5	3	15	3 ^o
• Lack of funding, staff replacement and retention of staff	5	5	4	14	4 ^o
• Close the gaps and embed it to training	5	3	5	13	5 ^o
• Learn from other countries and from other lessons (pandemic)	2	4	2	8	
• Create an evaluation forum for exercises	0	0	2	2	
• Succession of staff planning	1	1	2	4	
• Lack of awareness of decision makers (politicians) regarding training at EU	5	2	2	9	
• Need of include joint training & exercises in the regulations as mandatory	3	0	3	6	
• Equity and Diversity challenge	0	0	0	0	
• Raise EU awareness on existing CBRN needs of training	1	0	0	1	
• Interferences of politicians	2	0	0	2	
• Selection of the appropriate profile of trainees for specific exercises	1	0	0	1	
• Actual changes in existing protocols	1	1	1	3	
Topic 5: Post-incident joint evaluation, recovery and corrective measures Identified issues (<i>list with bullet points</i>)	Health Nº votes	Security Nº votes	Civil Protection Nº votes	Total Nº votes	General ranking
• Information not shared to other sectors	6	4	5	15	3 ^o
• Putting lessons in practice	2	5	5	12	
• Need of external-evaluation leader	6	1	3	10	
• Monodisciplinary focus	4	3	3	10	
• Lack of evaluation tool (WHO provide tool)	0	0	1	1	

• Reluctance to talk about capability	0	0	0	0	
• Politics involved	1	1	1	3	
• Loss of interest after time (slow system)	3	3	0	6	
• Need of complete circle (SOP)	0	1	0	1	
• Lack of legislation	3	1	1	5	
• Lack of human input in good work	0	0	0	0	
• Legal consequences	2	1	1	4	
• Lack of international debriefing	0	0	0	0	
• Prioritise evaluation	0	0	1	1	
• Not using exercises for evaluation; no consequences of not evaluating; not evaluating service performance	3	0	3	6	
• Small incident evaluation	1	0	0	1	

4.2 Session 2: analysing and deconstructing

As a result, from the session 2, the raised “key issues” were analysed in terms of “what went well or bad” in their own country experience and the related facilitating and blocking aspects. Raw-collected information is referred in Table 2.

In summary,

- **Facilitating aspects:** standard forms, tools for info sharing, clear definitions and procedures, regular reports, legislation and specific funds for exercises, dedicated staff, well planned and define roles and responsibilities, accountability after action evaluation and feed training and exercises with lessons learnt, retention of staff.
- **Blocking aspects:** lack of trust and person dependency, lack of willingness to share information during peace times, exchanges of information between sectors too limited to very high level, lack of interoperability, lack of cross-sectoral communication, fear of leaked information, competing priorities for funding and low availability of valuable skills.

Table 2: Results collected during the analysis and deconstruction session

What went well / what went wrong	Facilitating aspects	Blocking aspects
Topic 1: Surveillance systems, shared threat detection and joint risk assessment		
<p><i>Key issues analysed:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Surveillance systems</i> - <i>Joint threat detection procedures</i> - <i>Joint risk assessments</i> - <i>Written procedures and threshold for inter-sectoral communication</i> 		
<p><i>Group 1 country names: The Netherlands, Sweden</i></p> <p><i>Group 2 country names: Malta, Slovenia, UK</i></p>		
<i>Strong personal relationships (this is both good and bad)</i>	To write procedures anyway	Person dependent Not trust of other younger people
<i>Confidence to resource to the worst-case scenario and then step down</i>	Clear definitions about what is considered as a major incidence	
<i>Lessons learnt during incidents</i>	Regular reports Triangulate reports	Exchange of information between health and security happens at a very too high level
<i>Infrequent incidents do not have a clear leadership leading to unclear responsibilities</i>	Select plausible scenarios and assess or exercise chains of command	Most exercises focused on terror attacks do not begin with the threat detection at the health sector perspective
<i>Lack of procedures to conduct joint risk assessments and lack of vulnerability mapping</i>	Different speeds and ways of working	Reluctant to talk to other sectors Not a priority- these are infrequent events
<i>In the end it works well however? uncertainty</i>	Threshold to make contact Culture of working together Legislation promoting working together	
Topic 2: Cross-sectoral emergency planning (including strategic stockpiling) & governance		
<p><i>Key issues analysed:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Joint plan across sectors</i> - <i>Cross-sectoral communication on the plans</i> - <i>Operationalization of the plan (up to the different sectors and the local level)</i> - <i>Management of stockpiles across sectors (central stocks)</i> 		

<i>Group 1 country names: Croatia, Czech Republic, Serbia</i>		
<i>COVID-19 pandemic experience</i>	Legislative framework for prevention of communicable diseases (long tradition)	
<i>Joint plans facilitated by fire rescue service director general</i>	Delegation of responsibility to relevant experts	
	Plans are officially signed and mandatory	
	Based on situational and risk analysis	
<i>National strategy for disaster risk reduction under the Ministry of internal affairs</i>	Health sector is involved	Lack of interoperability
		Lack of operationalization
<i>National stock managed by governmental agency at strategic level and by civil protection at operational level</i>		Inadequate procurement timing
		Limited to medicines and food/water safety
<i>Administration of resources</i>		It takes too long due to paperwork
		Lack of dedicated manpower
<i>Plans not updated and not trained regularly</i>	Roles and responsibilities are predefined	Lack of cross-sectoral communication
	Plans are revisited and trained on a regular basis	
	There is an obligation for exercises	
<i>Percolation to local level</i>	Vertical authority from the national level	
<i>Group 2 country names: France, Greece, Spain</i>		
<i>Joint planning</i>	Mandatory district/regional based translation	Planning too much under a single ministry

	Responsibility under the Prime Minister or president, which means high-level authority ensuring cross-sectorality	Lack of joint exercises, testing and implementation (e.g., too local or excluding health aspects)
<i>First response and risk assessment</i>	Different expertise collaborating at both strategic and operational level	Lack of critical infrastructures domain consideration
		Lack of dedicated funding
		Lack of trained personnel
		Geographical spread
		Unknown origin at first (requiring adequate generic plans at first)
<i>Security strategy</i>	Regional crisis cells with all sectors involved and regular meetings	Biological risk mostly handled by the health sector
	EU framework: decisions, guiding documents, action plans (like the 2017 action plan)	Lack of updates on effective use and implementation of this EU framework
<i>Stocks</i>	Global (inter-sector and national) governance	Limits of production
	Shared access and management tool	High costs of material
	UCPM and RescEU mechanism	
	Wide-use material	
Topic 3: Cross-sectoral information sharing and flow in preparedness and response		
<i>Key issues analysed: Resource for information sharing</i>		
<i>Group 1 country names: France, Greece, Spain</i>		
<i>Group 2 country names: Belgium, Norway</i>		
<i>Available tools at EU-level</i> <i>Departments in different sectors are able to find the way to manage crises sufficiently with available resources</i>	Standard forms, centralization Capacity of adaptation of actors	Not good knowledge of the tools and users of the tools Lack of willingness of constant improvement

<i>Trust issues</i>	Information circulates better between services that usually work together	Fear of leaked information
<i>Timing: during crises or peacetime the urgency of access to information is completely different (from hours to weeks)</i>	Adaptability of tools	Heavy procedures People have less interest to exchange information during peacetime
Topic 4: Cross-sectoral capacity building, human resources, training and exercise		
<i>Key issues analysed: Planning Joint Exercises (national, regional & local)</i> <i>Group 1: country names: Malta, Slovenia, UK</i>		
<i>Planning Joint Exercises (national, regional & local), Example of Joint emergency services interoperable (JESIP), good and well-prepared exercises</i>	National political initiative included in the legislation Funds devoted to exercises Accountability by law Interest and motivation of stakeholders Right dedicated staff and funding for joint training and exercises	Lack of capacity to jointly organize the SIMEX Lack of staff Not implemented as foreseen Interferences of politicians & high decision makers
<i>Lack of funding, staff replacement and retention of staff</i>	Short term of political funding mainly after real events Recruitment & retention of staff (secession)	Competing priorities Not sustained provision of valuable skills
<i>Key issues analysed: Lack of funding, staff replacement and retention of staff</i> <i>Group 2 country names: The Netherlands, Sweden</i>		
<i>Close the gaps and embed it to training with tailor made training</i>	Review & evaluation of real events sectors <u>Proposed solutions are:</u> Use other methods, meetings to know partners, use cases studies, focus the exercises on specific parts or functions & avoid wide national exercises testing everything	No cross-sectoral evaluation Gaps are not identified There are no Joint exercises Exercises are not realistic
Topic 5: Post-incident joint evaluation, recovery and corrective measures		
<i>Key issues analysed: post-incident joint evaluation</i> <i>Group 1: country names: Belgium, Norway</i>		

<i>Based on experience</i>	Security clearances	Interpretation of the legislation Lack of initiative Lack of standard procedures Possible legal consequences prevent openness during the evaluation process
<i>International exchanges</i>	EU experts' groups	Monodisciplinary international institutions
<i>Confidentiality</i>	Legislation	Legislation Politics
<i>Gap between strategic and operational level</i>	Multidisciplinary strategic committee Multi-agency debriefing Local multidisciplinary evaluation	Structures in place
<i>Lacking part of exercise in recovery</i>		Limited resources
<i>Group 2 country names: Croatia, Czech Republic, Serbia</i> <i>Key issues analysed: Post-incident joint evaluation</i>		
<i>Experiences</i>	Crisis cycle includes evaluation Operational plan includes evaluation Independent board for evaluation, consisting of various experts New legislation after incidents	Not using exercises for evaluation Lack of capacities Lack of an external evaluator No legal consequences for not performing an evaluation Lack of training time Political evaluations demand attention and time New legislation after incidents
<i>Confidentiality</i>		Open commission report

4.3 Session 3: ideal situation and intervention needed

The session explored the ideal situation according to the perspective of all the country-participants, and the necessary steps to follow to reach this ideal situation drawn.

The tables 3a and 3b show the collected results during the ideal situation and intervention needed session.

In summary, the main sights to reach an ideal situation for the cross-sectoral collaboration are the following: some mentioned the legislation to have a solid legal framework, with the roles and responsibilities embedded in the preparedness legislation. It was also mentioned to have regular funds, a national agency for crisis management at the highest level, regular communication mechanisms, a platform and tools to share information, interoperability and interconnected surveillance, joint risk assessment, regular and mandatory training and exercises, standardization of capabilities adapted to current risks evaluation, after event reviews to feed the plans, protocols and SOPS.

Table 3a: Results collected during the ideal situation and intervention needed session.

Table 1: Belgium and Netherlands
<p>Ideal situation and intervention needed:</p> <p>Belgium and Netherlands</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint risk assessments at national level: still some gaps on this regard. All information goes up in the system from local to national in a vertical way. There should be improvements in designing procedures on how to share information horizontally at the central level. • Chemicals: A lot of work has to be conducted to improve risk assessments in the area of chemicals. • Electronic platforms to share information between the different sectors involved. • Trainings involving all sectors: both theoretical and simulation exercises.
Table 2: Greece, Spain, France
<p>Ideal situation and intervention needed:</p> <p>Greece</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train dedicated staff for risk assessment, supported by a network. • Interconnect the surveillance systems under one national authority. • Have a national agency for crisis management, at high interministerial level (to be also in charge of the stockpiling management). • Consolidate a common generic planning, a priori under the lead of civil protection. • Develop a platform at national level for information sharing across sector, using a common or at least interoperable technical language. • Make exercises and train-the-trainer sessions mandatory. • Apply an evaluation plan after every crisis, to collect feedback on a timely manner. <p>Spain</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish a crisis coordination unit at high level (not within one given ministry), with direct link to the operational leadership. • Clarify risk assessment and evaluation protocols, taking the event nature (variety of scenarios) and the different required experts into account. • Clearly identify focal points in each sector.

- Develop a tool / catalogue every involved sector to access up-to-date information on available capacities and resources.
- Consolidate a list of experts for specific topics, using a defined selection procedure.
- Tailor exercises according to defined objectives and public.
- Develop a culture of evaluation, emphasizing its positive aspects (there for improvement).
- Define indicators to measure the improvements during an evaluation.
- Ensure interoperability, adequate access and clear focal points for information databases.
- Set up criteria for reaction in every sector, including early warning.
- Consolidate legal back up to make things clear and mandatory.

France

- Further build up the existing specific crisis coordination service under the Prime Minister, to ensure sharing information to all stakeholders, with interoperability among sectors and with other countries.
- Extend the legal framework at local level to be more across sectors, as it is currently much within the security sector.
- Further integrate the stockpiling across sectors, eventually by creating a specific national agency to be in charge of it.
- Train the persons in charge of feeding/compiling the existing information sharing web portal, to avoid information overload (by filtering, synthesizing, structuring).
- Increase the training of high-level strategic staff.
- Ensure dedicated funding and staff for organizing training and exercises.
- Consider realistic scenarios for training and exercises.
- Possibly establish/mandate an independent entity to perform evaluations after both events and exercises, and to formulate reports including suggestions and advice for improvements.

Other perspectives discussed and remarks:

- Considering that CBRNe events are rare events, it is important to use realistic scenarios to foster the preparedness. Situation in the neighbour countries should be considered.
- EU tools - such as the EWRS (ECDC) and the SIENA (Europol) - and regulations - such as the IHR implementation - are useful but should be further integrated across sectors.
- Having a high-level authority above given sector's ministry is interesting. France might be an inspiration for this kind of entity.
- A Joint Action is linked to policy making. Its results should therefore be communicated at both Member States (via the partner organizations' directors) and European Commission (HADEA/SANTE, HERA, HSC at least) levels.
- Resources and expertise from EU Health Task Force (ECDC) initiative are interesting, but the timing, trigger and integration across the many existing bodies are important criteria.

Table 3: Croatia, Czech Republic, Serbia

Ideal situation and intervention needed

Ideal situation:

- Having an operational joint platform for information exchange.
- This platform would include all relevant actors both horizontally as vertically.
- Possibility to include external partners/experts when needed
- Platform used during whole preparedness and response cycle (peacetime and crises). So, mix of data collection and real time communication
- Access to the platform is adapted to the security needs.
- Platform is interoperable with other existing tools and systems. Also, at international level and with other countries.
- Allows evaluation of incidents.
- Platform centralizes information on capacities, research, incidents, activities, early warning, plans, ...
- Allows the identification of specific profiles

Intervention needed:

- Fully dedicated and equipped staff and facilities
- Enough qualified human resources (also among the stakeholders)
- Include the information exchange system into procedures/legislation
- Strong IT capacities

Table 4: Malta, Slovenia, UK

Other perspectives discussed and remarks:

- Important aspect to highlight: information sharing devoted to handle with gaps
- How to take advantage of lessons learnt from other sectors, other countries
- Joint evaluation is key
- Main threats for continuous training.
- The lack of funding.
- Lack of resources to be trained, staff shortage + lack of political awareness
- Civil preparedness should be taken into account: well prepared, well-funded, well evaluated
- Every year SIMEX are interesting, but key lessons and their applicability should also be highlighted
- There is in general a lack of joint CBRN courses for decision makers in all sectors.
- Gap of human capacity and gap in capacity to retain the human resources.
- Need of strategic level cross sectoral exercises
- The fact that terror attacks are low incidence; it is not a priority to train or exercise. Lack of awareness at national security level
- Lack of national strategy for mandatory CBRN Joint training

Table 5: Norway, Sweden

Ideal situation and intervention needed

- Hot debriefing after incident
- Local and national multidisciplinary incident evaluation
- Dedicated organisation for incident evaluation
- International debriefing for countries involved in other nations' incident (e.g. terrorist attack with foreign victims)

- Public inquiries for large-scale incidents
- Legislation that supports professional crisis management
- Standard operating procedures in place for all services
- Civil-military cooperation
- Sharing information with other sectors
- Putting lessons into practice (risk cycle)
- Smooth collaboration between local and national services
- Political will to implement elements or aspects of the lessons learned

Other perspectives discussed and remarks:

- International exchanges on CB terrorism response to share knowledge and expertise
- International regulations to aid national crisis management and response

Table 3.b: Third plenary session: conclusions of the tables' discussions

Table 1: Surveillance systems, shared threat detection and joint risk assessment

- Joint threats and risks assessment is a necessity. To reach these objective, gaps must still be addressed in terms of improving information sharing at national level (even before an incident occurs), tracking the movement of substances through early detection systems, and communicating to neighbor countries.

Table 2: Cross-sectoral emergency planning (including strategic stockpiling) & governance

- Developing an integrated data sharing system across sectors is key, with adequate interoperability and trained staff to encode and synthesize the data.
- Having a high-level authority above ministries can facilitate the collaboration. A central specific agency for crisis management and stockpiling can be also of interest, especially if well connected to both strategic and operational levels.
- Common technical language, interoperability and clear trained focal points are required across the different existing platforms. A central overarching platform might even be considered as well.
- Training should be mandatory (in task mandate) and recurrent for high level and strategic staff. This requires enough funds.
- Dedicated plan and/or entity could allow systematic evaluation process, in the perspective of a positive and constructive culture of evaluation.
- Legal and regulatory back-up are useful to make things endorsed and applied.

Table 3: Cross-sectoral information sharing and flow in preparedness and response

- Each Member State should have a joint platform to share information, and such platform should further be connected to a horizontal and vertical network of technical experts.
- Enough data visibility should be ensured to the relevant stakeholders.
- Vision and access on resources stocks should be shared across sectors.

- The (results of) the different relevant research projects should be integrated.
- A strong IT support is needed to ensure data security, data analysis, possibly with real-time data and the use of automated/artificial intelligence processing.
- Different features might be centralized in one big platform. The use of this single or multiple platform(s) should be in any case exercised.
- Adequate position should be found for evaluators, neither too close nor too far from the responders.

Table 4: Cross-sectoral capacity building, human resources, training and exercise

- National and international data sharing should be performed on a regular basis.
- Interoperability principles should be properly embedded in the used systems.
- Information sharing network should be robust and secure, from the field to the strategic level, back and forth.
- Implementation in legislation is key.
- Accountability for governance could be guaranteed by a dedicated agency/officer.
- Stockpiling should be built in a joint interoperable perspective, at least for a joint strategic reserve, with clear procurement procedure.
- Joint operation and communication principles should be applied.
- Communication should be increased.
- Adequate funding should be foreseen for the whole community of responders.
- The sustainability of funds is key.
- Robust national training program/framework should be implemented.
- Lessons learned should be followed up.

Table 5: Post-incident joint evaluation, recovery and corrective measures

- Legislative framework is important but should be complemented with a structured practical agreement on what (information) needs to be shared, and what to do with it.
- Adequate data system should support this practical agreement.
- A dedicated structure should follow up (and address) the gaps identified during exercises.

4.4 Session 4: guiding document content and audience

The gathered inputs resulted from the discussion on the content and audience of the GD are shown in the table 4.

In summary, the key issues prioritized in session 4 were (see table 5):

Regarding **target audience**:

- Document should be suitable for different levels, both political and strategic. For political level, a very short impact version is indicated.

Regarding the content:

- It should include concrete elements (e.g., good practices), not being too generic.
- Use of annex to provide additional tools and references, templates, recommendations, check lists, supporting materials, but no procedures (that should be developed according to countries features).
- Document should not be too strict, preferably it should provide methodologies/solutions that can be adapted to the countries.

Document should stay open to adaptations to remain suitable in the future.

A deeper analysis will be performed during the guiding document development.

Table 4: Results collected during the session guiding document content and audience.

Table 1: Belgium and Netherlands
<p>Potential target audience of the guiding document:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both strategic level and operational <p>Content:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The five sections used in this workshop are a good structure for the building blocks of the document. These five sections could be maintained as chapters in the guide. Other guiding documents can be consulted to get inspiration for the general structure. • The document should be short ("less is more"). • It should include: methodological support for joint risk assessment • Options for good practices and recommendations. • Flow charts or check lists are tricky since each country has its own structure and own way of doing things.
Table 2: France, Greece, Spain
<p>Potential target audience of the guiding document:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The public of the document is situated between the technical/operational responders and the politicians. It is a strategic document for the national level actors in charge of the planning development and implementation. Next to this full main version, a second short version might be written for the political world, with a summary of the main conclusions and key recommendations requiring political decision and vision ("lobby note").

- Recommendations for EU bodies might be included as well.

Content:

- The purpose is not to develop a plan as such, but to guide into the planning process. In that perspective, the document could include checklists, recommendations, methodology and characteristics. It should not include procedures (too detailed) or templates (too operational).
- The main structure of the document should not be divided per sector, but rather per topic/thematic module.
- There is a balance to find for the level of details: recommendations should not be too generic, but should be flexible enough to ensure possible adaptation in every country.
- It was referred to previous action plans (first in 2005/2006, then in 2017) from DG HOME, including checklists. These potential references are assessed as good but very ambitious, and without very clear follow-up and up-to-date situation.
- The importance of the cross-border risks and international collaboration should be emphasized.
- Regarding the citation of the country's names, it is suggested to keep them only for concrete good examples and potential inspiration sources (positive approach).
- The scope of the document should be clarified at the beginning ("disclaimer").
- A short (as concrete as possible) checklist per topic could be added in the (eventually confidential) annexes.
- A clear link to the previous WP6 activities should be made, to clarify where the information comes from and allow to give it a certain weight. In this sense, the guiding document should aggregate and synthesize the findings of the previous activities.
- A references list should be included, at least the most important ones identified during the desk research.
- The adopted methodology should be clearly reminded, along with its limitations.
- The document should also include proposals for further update/implementation/sustainability, in order to promote its long-term use. This includes the consideration of a central EU level host, and suggestion of practical activities (exercises, survey update ...).
- Long term recommendations and solutions should be preferred when possible.

Table 3: Czech Republic, Croatia, Serbia

Potential target audience of the guiding document:

- Can be plural, important that lay-out and content adapted to audience. Document can be provided in different forms to target different audiences.
- Ideally not for politicians, more for managers.

Content:

- Good practices applicable to all
 - Practical elements and solutions
 - Facilitating elements
 - Continuity/evaluation strategy for the implementation of good practices
 - Identification of key actors that could provide help for implementation/assessments of solutions

- Includes experiences on training and exercise
 - Concerns all phases of disaster risk management
 - Data-based
 - Should include a mix of texts and graphs
 - Easy to read, avoid heavy literature style

Table 4: Malta, Slovenia, UK

Potential target audience of the guiding document:

A tool that guides us for communication with other sectors (at local, regional and national levels)

- Some experts proposed two versions: one for strategic and one for politicians (summary with a letter)
- Not a big doc but practical

Content:

- The GD should include definitions, for instance of CBRN-e
- It should also include standards assurance, materials for audit assurance & evaluation
- Some prefer not to include procedures, but best practices, recommendations and check lists and supporting and reference materials with links to the websites
- Priority topics: Joint risk assessment and cross-sectoral communication
- A dissemination plan

Table 5: Norway, Sweden

Potential target audience of the guiding document:

- Structured for different profiles, with separate chapters for:
 - Policy makers
 - Political leaders
 - Operational staff

Content:

- Overview of European capacities and capabilities
- Overview of the reach back capabilities of the EU and NATO
- Risk & crisis communication
- Support for the development of a national framework, including:
 - Suggestions
 - Good practices on different topics
 - Links to national information
 - Inspiration
 - A list of minimum demands or recommendations:
 - Procedures
 - Templates
 - Joint evaluation

- Joint assessment
- ...
- Limit text
 - Checklist assessment with simple questions
- Test case as annex to test and discuss the guiding document on a national level
- Information on training and exercises
 - Template with test case
 - Methodology on evaluation
 - Methodology on the organisation of workshops to discuss main issues (e.g. SimEx Madrid, Workshop Zagreb)

Other perspectives discussed (some countries provided opposing views on some suggestions) in the paragraph under the box)

- Structure of the Bioterrorism Handbook of the ECDC as inspiration for the guiding document
- Structure and content of the Handbook on Biological Terrorism of the US CDC as inspiration for the guiding document
- Institution responsible for the guiding document: DG HERA, DG ECHO,...
- Long-term goals for the guiding document of the European institutions?
- Document should be suitable for different levels as both political and strategic (operational) level has an impact on the implementation of the document
- Document should include concrete elements (e.g., good practices), not being too generic
- The document should not be too big but practical
- Use of annex to provide additional tools and explore some elements more in depth
- It should contain templates, recommendations, check lists, supporting materials, but no procedures (that should be developed according to countries features)
- Document should not be too strict, preferably it should provide methodologies/solutions that can be adapted to the countries
- Document should stay open to adaptations to remain suitable in the future.

5 Key conclusions

The scope of the guiding document should remain at strategic level, with a summary version for politicians, for them to be aware and to endorse its implementation.

Regarding the content, it should include concrete elements, clear definitions and providing supporting materials with methodologies, tools, references, templates, check lists, good practices but not procedures.

The guiding document should inspire solutions to be adapted to countries specificities.

The content of this report, together with the rest of the deliverables resulting from the WP6 activities will continue contributing to the result of the GD (survey, experts' interviews, simulation exercise, and workshop).

6 Annexes

6.1 Agenda

WP6 Workshop on Cross Sectoral Collaboration in Preparedness and Response to Bio/Chemterrorist attacks

Programme

General Objective:

To establish the main aspects and content to be considered for the development of a guiding document addressed to improve cross-sectoral collaboration in Preparedness and Response to bio/chem terrorist attacks in the context of WP6 activities results.

Specific Objectives:

1. Identify and prioritize the issues to address.
2. Analyse facilitating and blocking aspects for cross-sectoral collaboration improvement.
3. Define the scope, target audience and main outlines of the WP6 guiding document on cross-sectoral collaboration.

Day 1:

Schedule	Content
8:00 h	Registration
8:30 h	Opening. Hosting country authorities. JA Coordination.
9:00 h	Presentation of previous WP6 activities, selected topics and expected outcomes for the workshop
9:30h	<u>First Working Session</u> : Identifying World café to identify issues related to the selected topics, based on participant's experiences.
	Coffee Break. (embedded within the session)
11:15h	<u>Plenary session</u> :

	Discuss and agree on the prioritization of the issues per topic to be discussed during the workshop
12:15h	<u>Second working session</u> : Analyzing and Deconstructing Key issue: What went well/ what went wrong? - Deconstructing. Facilitating and blocking aspects [first distribution]
13:15h	Group picture and Lunch
14:00h	<u>Second working session (continuation)</u> : Key issue 2: What went well/ what went wrong? - Deconstructing. Facilitating and blocking aspects [second distribution]
15:00h	<u>Plenary session</u> : Present and discuss the outputs of the 2 nd working session
16:10h	Coffee Break
16:30h	<u>Third working session</u> : Ideal situation and its path toward it Strategic wrap-up on a country level: What would be the ideal situation? Which intervention would be needed to reach the ideal situation?
17:30h	Conclusions of the day

Day 2:

Schedule	Content
9:00 h	Opening day 2 - Summary of the previous day
9:15h	<u>Plenary session</u> : Present and discuss the outputs of the 3 rd working session.
10:30h	Coffee Break
11:00h	<u>Plenary session</u> : Round table from the DGs SANTE, ECHO, HOME /CBRN Advisory Committee. Q&A



12:00h	Lunch
13:00h	<u>Fourth working session:</u> Guiding document content Inputs for the WP6 guiding document. What should be the content and target audience of the guiding document to support actors to reach the ideal situation?
13:45h	<u>Plenary session:</u> Consolidate scope, target audience and main outlines of the guiding document.
15:30h	Coffee break
16:00h	Next steps to build the guiding document
16:30h	Main conclusions of the workshop
17:00h	Closure <i>QR code with event evaluation form will be shared</i>

6.2 Participant's list

Country	Sector	Institution
Belgium	Public Health	Sciensano
		Federal Public Service (FPS)
	Security Enforcement -Law	National Crisis Center (NCCN) - CBRNe Expertise Center
		National Crisis Centre (NCCN)
	Civil Protection	Central Counterterrorism Division, Federal Judicial Police
	Civil Protection	Intern Affairs Ministry - Civil Protection
Croatia	Public Health	Croatian Institute of Public Health
		Faculty of Medicine, University of Zagreb
		Croatian Institute of Public Health
		Croatian Institute of Public Health (CIPH), Division for epidemiology of communicable diseases
	Security Enforcement -Law	General Police directorate; Ministry of the Interior
		Ministry of the Interior, Forensic Science Center Ivan Vučetić
Civil Protection	Ministry of the Interior, Services for operational affairs and analytics	
Czech Republic	Security Enforcement -Law	Counter Terrorism and Extremism Agency
	Civil Protection	Population Protection Institute
France	Public Health	Biothreats and epidemic preparedness / International Health Regulations / Crisis preparedness office / Directorate General for Health / Ministry of Health and Prevention
Greece	Public Health	National Public Health Organization
	Security Enforcement -Law	Joint Coordination Centre for Cooperation & Crisis Management
Malta	Public Health	Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Unit
	Civil Protection	Hazmat Unit; Civil Protection
Netherlands	Public Health	Municipal Health Services, Kennemerland, Haarlem; Safety Region Kennemerland
	Security Enforcement -Law	Explosives & Security CBRN-E, Police Rotterdam
	Civil Protection	National Institute for Public Health and the Environment
Norway	Public Health	Norwegian Directorate of Health
		Norwegian CBRNe medical and advisory center
		Norwegian Food Safety Authority
		Norwegian Directorate of Health

6.3 Satisfaction survey results

A general satisfaction survey was sent via email to all the participants few days after the workshop (4th December). The results are described below.

The questionnaire included 13 questions with a response scale from "0" (fully disagree) to "5" (fully agree).

Twenty eight out of 34 participants from 13 countries filled the satisfaction survey.

Among responders, the 61% (17) were members of institutions involved in the JA; the 29% (8) of them were external stakeholders but not part of the JA TERROR partnership and 11% (3) considered themselves in the "other" category.

Per sector, the 54% (18) of the responders were from the health sector, the 21% (8) from the civil protection sector and 21% (8) from the law enforcement sector. One person did not specify his/her sector.

The 89 % reported that the content of the event was relevant for their professional tasks and responsibilities (average =4,5).

The 89% agreed on what they heard and learnt at the event was useful and applicable to my professional tasks and responsibilities (average of 4,4).

The 74% agreed on the statement that all subjects were covered in depth (average of 4,1).

Regarding the possibility to consider the outcomes of the event in their organisation, the 78% agree on the statement (average of 4,1). The possibility to implement the outcomes of the event in their organisation or country the 50% agree while 42% not agree or disagree (average of 3,5).

When asked about the timeframe when the outcomes implementation, the 35% consider that at least in one year, 46% think that at least 2 years, and 20 % think that 3 or more years are needed for implementing such implementation.

Regarding the methodology used for the workshop, the 86% agree on the event format was suitable for the achieving its purposes (average of 4,4). Concerning the methods of knowledge transfer and joint creation of knowledge were effective for the 71% agree while the 22% do not agree or disagree (average of 4,1).

The 96% agree with the statement that "I had enough opportunity to actively participate" (average of 4,6). The 100% of participants with this sentence: the atmosphere of the event and of the discussions was open and constructive was (average 5,0).

The satisfaction of the activity is very high according to the scores provided by the participants in the satisfaction survey.